In 1995, the Peronist party held Argentina's presidential office, a comfortable majority in both congressional chambers, and most provincial governorships and was not only temporally and territorially limited, but also politically nurtured and institutionally bounded.
Introduction
In 1995, the Justicialista party held Argentina's presidential office, a comfortable majority in both congressional chambers, and most provincial governorships and municipalities. In 2006, the political landscape looks exactly the same. However, between 2001 and 2002 the country arguably went through its most serious crisis ever, which led to massive popular uprisings, the early resignation of two presidents and the largest debt default in international history. This article questions a widespread vision that sees the collapse as a spontaneous and definite rupture with the past (for an exception see Levitsky and Murillo 2003) . Instead, it argues that the social revolt detonated in December 2001 was not only temporally and territorially limited, but also politically nurtured and institutionally bounded.
* A previous version of this article was delivered at the XXVI Latin American Studies Association Congress (LASA), San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 15-18, 2006 . I am grateful to Simón Pachano, Nancy Postero and León Zamosc for valuable suggestions; unfortunately, errors and interpretation remain my own.
** Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon. Email: andres.malamud@eui.eu the 1950s Argentina accounted for half of the Latin American GDP, by 1980 it had long been surpassed by Brazil and Mexico and its regional share was below 17% (WBDI several years). However, political instability apparently came to an end in 1983, while economic decline seemed to reverse its course in 1991.
In 1983, in the wake of the foreign debt crisis and a defeat at war, the military returned to the barracks and democracy and the rule of law were restored. The armed forces never took power again, although a significant uncertainty (generated by a handful of military uprisings) was not over until 1990. The newly inaugurated democratic regime was to be the long-lasting ever in the history of the country.
However, novelty came together with legacy: the same two parties that had dominated most of Argentine politics during the twentieth century, i.e. the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR or Radicals) and the Partido Justicialista (PJ or Peronists), won all the elections held since October 1983. Hence, during the following two decades the PJ governed the country for nearly twelve years while the UCR -alone or in coalition 3 -ruled for about eight years (Malamud 2004) . In spite of their fairly equilibrated electoral performance, government performance differ widely across these parties: while the PJ was able to complete the two mandates to which it was elected (1989-95 and 1995-99) , the UCR was unable to complete any of its two presidential terms (1983-89 and 1999-03) .
Notably, street manifestations were a factor in both anticipated terminations. 4 This phenomenon has been dubbed "the new iron law of Argentine politics", meaning that "non-Peronists are able to win presidential elections but are unable to govern until the end of their terms in office" (Calvo and Murillo 2005: 226) . At the time of this writing, the PJ holds once again the executive office after receiving 60 percent of the votesumming the totals of its three main candidates -in the presidential election held in
In what regards the economy, the turning point occurred some time later, in 1991. Up to that moment, the Argentine society had been characterized by growing patterns of consumption that were not matched by production output. Ensuing dissatisfaction, in addition to fostering political instability, further fed economic instability. As a consequence, the economic cycle showed high peaks and steep falls which ever-changing policies all but aggravated, leading to increasing deterioration as measured against international parameters (Prados de la Escosura 2000; Gerchunoff and Llach 2003) . At the same time, the state apparatus was overextended but its effective capacities were extremely weak (O'Donnell 1993; Waisman 1998; Acuña 2001) . Two catastrophic peaks of hyper-inflation, in 1989 and 1990 , paved the way for dramatic policy turns. Just sworn in, PJ's President Carlos Menem embarked on an ambitious process of state reform, aiming at recovering stability and growth through massive privatization, economic deregulation and opening to world markets. His policies were remarkably successful in the first years, leading most observers to believe that Argentina had finally left the road to decadence and that joining the developed countries was a goal at hand. This article is set to analyze the events that showed how this belief was but delusion. Before doing so, though, a brief description of the country's institutional setting may be helpful for understanding the context of the political process.
The Argentine Constitution, drafted in 1853-60 and only slightly amended until 1994, established a federal system and a presidential form of government. A federal system means that the component sub-national units -called provinces -have autonomy to choose their own rulers and pass their own legislation, albeit subordinated to the federal legal framework. A presidential form of government means that the chief executive is elected for a fixed term through mechanisms independent from the national legislature -called Congress -such as a popular vote.
Federalism is a power-sharing arrangement that grants considerable competences to sub-national authorities, i.e. the governors, vis-à-vis national authorities. In Argentina, this constitutional room for maneuver has been further magnified by political practice, as governors have traditionally controlled the electoral politics of their provinces including party machines and electoral nominations. Hence, they have become powerful gate-keepers within their parties, holding large influence over political recruitment and career paths -even when their protégées are federal legislators, as their chance to run for reelection depend not on performance but on the will of their provincial boss (Botana 1977; Calvo et al 2001) .
The Argentine type of presidentialism has traditionally been seen as conferring significant power to the chief executive in detriment of the parliamentary branch. The alleged presidential dominance over the Argentine Congress was labeled as 'hyperpresidentialism' by the prestigious legal scholar Carlos Nino, and although further studies nuanced this claim, they supported its main argument (Nino 1992; Jones 1997; Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1998) . However, in the last years -even before the 2001 events that are the focus of this article -a growing literature has contributed to further moderate this view, arguing instead that congressional proceedings have effectively checked the executive in some crucial issues and forced it to negotiate (Etchemendy and Palermo 1998; Llanos 2002) . In short, between 1983 and 2001 the political system exhibited a Congress capable of limiting executive power, though congressmen did not respond to a popular constituency but rather to the political will of their provincial bosses. This meant that the provincial governors had the capacity to obtain concessions from the federal government via congressional proxy.
The territorial basis of Argentine politics is also visible at the municipal level.
Although municipalities do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the provinces as the latter do vis-à-vis the federal government, they do possess political autonomy and budgetary resources. This is especially so in areas of large demographic concentration, of which Greater Buenos Aires is the utmost instance. 5 Consequently, mayors have been traditionally able to control and mobilize large numbers of people, who mostly depend on clientelism and public handouts for subsistence (Auyero 1997) .
Remarkably, most departments of Greater Buenos Aires have traditionally been ruled by Peronist bosses.
The stage is ready: enter the actors.
The collapse: agency or fatality?
The path that leads to disaster is usually easy to see… afterwards. In the case at stake, however, there was a growing succession of signs that led some observers to forecast the storm since the first clouds appeared on the horizon, on October 6, 2000.
That day Carlos "Chacho" Álvarez resigned to the vice-presidency of the Republic and ignited a major crisis in the Alianza ruling coalition.
The Alianza had come to power in December 1999 after more than ten years of Therefore, his appointment was repulsive for most of the president's party comrades and deeply alienated the partisan sources of support of the administration.
Cavallo's designation did not produce the expected impact on the economy.
Instead, the country risk index continued to rise and bank deposits decreased rapidly, as a powerful expression of diminishing trust on financial and monetary stability. The midterm elections of October 14 sentenced the administration in advance: although significant abstention and self-spoiled voting (voto bronca) captured the attention of both the media and the public and were read as general dissatisfaction with the political system, the concrete result was that the Alianza lost control of Congress to Peronism.
According to public opinion surveys, popular discontent was generalized; its effects, however, were unevenly distributed across party lines. FREPASO virtually disappeared, whereas the UCR only resisted in a few provincial strongholds. Peronism, in turn, was internally divided as a result of unresolved struggles for leadership that were fed by the victories most provincial bosses carried in their districts. However, the top party leaders smelled the opportunity and started to make their moves. (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) and also with De la Rúa up to that moment, even when both were radicals and the Senate majority was consistently held by the
Peronists. This time, however, opportunity would prevail over tradition. Given the vicepresidential vacancy, the Peronist strategy meant that the nominee would be the first in line for the presidential succession. Should De la Rúa travel abroad, get sick, or be unable to continue his term for whatever reasons, an opposition leader would take his place. Such a "cohabitation" practice was unheard of in a presidential regime like the Argentine one. But, as it turned out, it was not cohabitation what the PJ leaders had in mind when they appointed Ramón Puerta, a former governor of the middle-sized province of Misiones, as new president of the Senate. Puerta took office in the first days of December, when the newly elected legislators did. By that time, everything had started to fall apart.
On November 30, 1 billion pesos had been withdrawn from the banking system.
To stave off a run on the banks and prevent complete collapse, De la Rúa declared banking restrictions effective December 3 in the form of a partial freeze (corralito).
This measure eventually ended the currency board system (convertibilidad) that De la Rúa's economy minister himself, Cavallo, had put into place a decade before. As a result of the freezing, savers were unable to withdraw their money from bank deposits.
Although these measures were aimed at controlling the banking crisis for a period of On December 7, an analyst reported that "the PJ made yesterday the decision to stop the offensive that many internal sectors were pushing for and that aimed at accelerating -by action or inaction -Fernando de la Rúa's time". 7 The PJ leaders estimated that the President might not be able to complete his tenure, but they did not want to appear as his hangmen. Moreover, most Peronists did not believe they were yet ready to get back to power. Several economists were predicting the end of the Convertibilidad and the inevitability of currency devaluation, so common sense indicated that it was better for the opposition that the costs were paid by the ruling coalition. Hence, the PJ parliamentary leaders decided not to modify the vacancy law (ley de acefalía), as such move would have been interpreted as an outright decision to go for the president.
On December 12 the Deputy Minister of Justice, Melchor Cruchaga, summoned his cabinet of advisors. This was supposed to be a regular meeting, as these gatherings were convened every Wednesday at lunch time. This time, however, there would be an extraordinary participant: the main advisor to the Minister. The meeting started with one of the Deputy's advisors performing an in-depth analysis of the political situation; his conclusion was that the government would not be able to survive past March.
Surprisingly, the Minister's advisor agreed with the analysis and added information and comparative experience that supported it. The relevance of this event is underscored by the fact that the Minister of Justice was Jorge de la Rúa, the President's brother and one of his closest aides. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the President was informed about this warnings, which were also being issued in other governmental Arguably, the political collapse was mainly a consequence of structural factors related to the economy. However, this does neither explain the erratic management nor the political consequences of the crisis. Although the PJ decided not to push De la Rúa out of power, they got prepared for such a possibility by appointing one of theirs first in the line of succession. In turn, De la Rúa did not leave office voluntarily but his behavior showed that he would not take any measures to face the raising threats or control their damages. The economic crisis may have been unavoidable, but its political spillover was not. Peronist readiness for power, combined with Radical neglect of warnings, set the stage for the emergence of an unexpected political actor: the people on the streets.
The rebellion: spontaneous or orchestrated?
The bitterest period of the political crisis unfolded in the less than two weeks This had been the spark that lit the fire. Yet, more relevant than the spark was that, when the expected fireman, i.e. president De la Rúa, appeared on the scene, he seemed to be pouring gasoline rather than water.
In the morning of December 19, De la Rúa attended a meeting with businessmen and labor unionists organized by Caritas Argentina. Not only was him insulted and booed by passing citizens as he entered and left the gathering, but he was also strongly criticized by the participants within the meeting. 11 By that time, almost every relevant political actor -including the President's party -were demanding the resignation of Cavallo. De la Rúa seemed to be aware that his own fate was tied to his minister's, but he still thought that both would be able to hold on and overcome the political disturbances. His mood worsened as the day passed and the lootings gained in violence and spread.
Earlier in the morning in which, through Caritas, the Catholic Church attempted a desperate mediation between the government and the main sectoral representatives, a series of looting and riots had ravaged several municipalities in Greater Buenos Aires.
Predominantly working-class and politically Peronist, most of these districts were ruled by PJ mayors who had large clientelistic networks fed by public funds and activated through party machines. Some of these mayors, such as Moreno's Mariano West, ostensibly led columns of protesters and some of his lieutenants organized attacks on food stores (Auyero 2006: 20) . Although other mayors did not personally show up, many of them sent municipal forces to the field with the intention not to avoid the lootings but to minimize any unnecessary violence that they might entail. Remarkably, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police ("la bonaerense", which ultimately answered to Governor Carlos Ruckauf, a top Peronist) performed a similar role. 12 No conclusive evidence has been provided that the Police central headquarters authorized "liberated zones" (zonas liberadas), thus allowing dwellers to sack small and medium-size stores while protecting the larger ones. However, it has been documented that, in some localities, police agents did not only allow dwellers to sack but even participated in the lootings (Auyero 2006) . Although some aides to De la Rúa denounced this fact, high officers of the Buenos Aires province (including police authorities) denied the accusation. In their view, the police forces were simply outnumbered by the crowds and the only thing they could do was to limit the damages. 13 They also pointed out that the lootings in Greater Buenos Aires were no lesser than those occurred in the Federal Capital, jurisdiction of the Federal Police -which depended on the national government and, therefore, could not be blamed for being puppeteered by the Peronist opposition.
This was not accurate though: the protests that took place with epicenter at Plaza de Mayo, just off the federal government house, had been violently repressed by the security forces. As would become clear later, however, this was not due to the national administration efficiency to keep order but to the action of some Federal Police elements that had a different agenda from the government. 14 In fact, the Police took varied approaches in different locations of the Federal Capital. In the popular neighborhood of Constitución, they repelled two attacks on a supermarket with rubber bullets and tear gas; in other places, in contrast, they showed up but did not repress.
Their orders were to "take care that the lootings were smooth, that is, to prevent personal and material damages".
15
With violence mounting across Argentina's major cities, De la Rúa began to consider alternative measures to restore order. The first option considered was to deploy the military to contain the violence. However, the legislation forbade military intervention in domestic security matters unless the security forces were overwhelmed; moreover, the military were unwilling to take the blame if violence got worse. With military intervention no longer an option, De la Rúa bowed to some of his advisors' suggestion and resorted to declaring a state of siege, deploying the Federal Police, the National Gendarmerie (border guard) and the Naval Prefecture (coast guard) to contain the growing violence.
Although this measure had been requested by some governors and was afterwards officially supported by the PJ, it was the President alone who carried the burden of communicating it to the public. And he did it in the worst possible way. The 14 One of De la Rúa's closest aides, who afterwards represented him in the case he faced for alleged misuse of legal force, reported to the author that the evidence regarding four of the protesters who were killed by the police pointed to fusilamientos policiales (police shooting executions) rather than involuntary casualties. In brief, the victims were shot lead bullets from short distances by police agents. Some former government officers still claim, off the record, that the deaths were provoked not by Federal Police agents but by covert elements of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police in an attempt to destabilize De la Rúa.
produced an effect opposite to expected: instead of pacifying an irritated citizenry, it was considered a provocation. De la Rúa looked distant and insensitive to what was taking place. Some of his aides even qualified his speech as "autistic". 16 As the consequent reactions showed, many people perceived that the seriousness of the situation had not been caught by the administration. Consequently, they decided to take action in order to make their voice heard.
Following the broadcast, spontaneous cacerolazos (pot-banging manifestations)
started to take place in diverse locations of Buenos Aires, signaling the middle-class's unrest. This type of protest had been practiced in the last years of the Menem administration, but only through windows and balconies. This time it was different. In the evening, when the summer sun was still visible, groups of people from middle-class quarters of Buenos Aires went out to the streets banging on pots and pans, stridently rejecting the president's request for moderation. There was no single starting point: the protest initiated more or less at the same time in scattered neighborhoods, and only afterwards did the media started to report these spontaneous occurrences. Key streetcrossings were rapidly populated by noisy crowds, and gradually these groups started to move towards the Plaza de Mayo. There was neither previous organization nor in-time coordination, except by e-mails that were circulating all over the city and country (SMSs were not yet available in Argentina). Radio and TV forecasts trailed much after the events.
By dinner time, all major avenues that led to the city center were packed by marching multitudes. They reached Plaza de Mayo shouting what would become the grievance's brand: "que se vayan todos" ("all of them must go"). Cavallo was no longer the main target of popular anger: De la Rúa's unfortunate speech had transformed latent resentments into open, all-out contestation. What had began as rioting by unemployed and leftist-leaning groups turned into a middle-class protest, which was oriented towards the political authorities rather than against neighborhood stores. To be sure, the cacerolazos were a more peaceful form of protest than the saqueos (lootings); but peace would not last. Further incidents between police forces and protesters continued to take place long after midnight, provoking seventeen dead all throughout the country -of which five in Plaza de Mayo. 17 The government was caught by surprise by the revolt of Buenos Aires' middle-classes, which had historically been the staunchest supporters of
De la Rúa. Overwhelmed by the events, the president decided to loose hand to the economy minister only after his aides convinced him that his permanence would weaken, not strengthen, whatever negotiating capacity the government might still have. 18 December 19 concluded with the resignation of Cavallo, but this gesture soon proved to be insufficient.
The protests went on the following day. Although the administration had agreed with the military their participation in an emergency handing-out of food, the plan failed from San Luis and Roggero was apparently speaking on their behalf. Social unrest went on in the streets, but now was clear that the administration was definitely on its own.
After knowing the Peronists' response, and as social mobilizations kept growing throughout the country, De la Rúa decided to resign from office. Just a few ministers remained at his side. The situation in the Plaza de Mayo was still too violent for him to leave by car to his official residence, thus the President's security detail decided to take him out of the Casa Rosada onboard an Air Force helicopter. The images of De la Rúa's "escape" by helicopter were broadcast and did not help to weaken public irritation.
Street violence slowly abated nonetheless. By the end of the day, the death toll amounted to 29 people. 19 According to foreign observers, Buenos Aires looked like
Beirut. Most streets in the city downtown were blocked, half with masonry and broken glasses from the windows of surrounding stores, half with smoking tyres and furniture.
Almost no commercial buildings, especially banks and food stores, had been spared.
Many cars laid turned around, some still burning. Explosions were sporadically heard and half-naked, face-covered men carrying threatening sticks prowled around. The smell of burning rubber and powder filled the air. Suddenly, beautiful and cosmopolitan Buenos Aires had transformed itself into a city at war. The Capital was smoking; the country, acephalous.
The President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, Ramón Puerta, took over as Interim President until Congress could appoint a successor to De la Rúa. A presidential mandate had been terminated prior to its constitutional deadline due to popular mobilizations and political deadlock. Now the people were returning to their homes, so it was on the politicians' court to break the deadlock and restore governability. Or so they thought.
The way out: congressional autonomy or governors' decision?
The The meetings between the two groups took place at various congressional offices, the decisive summit being held in the one occupied by interim federal president Ramón Puerta. The final decision split the difference: the appointee would govern for three months and call early elections in March 2002, as the "big governors" aspired, but he would be a member of the "smalls" group: Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, governor of San Luis. Both sectors seemed satisfied with the agreement, aptly termed by the press as "project of the bigger, men of the smaller". 20 The Peronists' clear majority on both houses ensured that Rodríguez Saá would be elected on December 22.
The nomination of Rodríguez Saá, a traditional caudillo from a small province, was endorsed by PJ lawmakers alone in Congress. No opposition party voted for him.
To broaden his base of support, the new president embarked from the first moment on ambitious projects aimed at gaining popularity. Hence, most congressmen bestowed him with a standing ovation when, in his inauguration speech, he declared the decision to default on the public debt. This decision was also received enthusiastically by a public opinion that got a dose of symbolic relief from such a measure, which arguably punished key responsible actors of the collapse, i.e. the foreign creditors. However, public discontent was far from over and a seemingly banal decision of Rodríguez Saá would trigger it again just a few days later. spontaneous and nonviolent manifestation by middle-class savers was followed by aggressive assaults by political activists and common gangs, which in turn provoked the repression of the security forces. 26 This time, however, the separation between the consecutive phases was clear-cut so the consequences were not suffered by innocent citizens, who were mostly sleeping when the riots unfolded. The thousands of middleclass citizens and families, who had experienced a sort of sociable get-together, learned the next morning through radio and TV that their peaceful manifestation had ended up in sheer violence.
After the confrontations that took place in Plaza de Mayo, the riots moved on a dozen blocks away to the Congress. There, some demonstrators managed to get into the building, setting furniture on fire and throwing out a few paintings and statues. The perpetrators did not go much further and damages were limited, but the images of fire in the Congress Palace were broadcast worldwide and conferred the events a more dramatic tone than they actually had.
The first consequence of the riots was the resignation of Carlos Grosso.
However, the corollary was clear: it was the president who was definitely weakened by the protest, just a few days after a similar movement had entailed the termination of his At a vertiginous speed, the situation seemed to replicate the events that had led to the resignation of De la Rúa. The pattern can be resumed as follows: popular -but not always spontaneous-manifestations lead to the ousting of a constitutional president and leave formal power in congressional hands, whereas real power rests firmly with the provincial authorities. In both cases, the governors' decision to act -or remain quietdefined the evolution of events. 
Conclusion
Conventional accounts have it that the events of December 2001, which led to the early resignation of two constitutional presidents, were ignited by popular revolt and solved through parliamentary means. Diversely, this paper contends that a third, crucial factor was behind both the origin and outcome of the crisis: the (more or less purposeful) action of key Peronist subnational executives -i.e. mayors and governors.
Henceforth, two mostly overlooked elements are brought to the fore. First, party politics: it was the Peronist leaders who prepared the stage to get back to power, not a spontaneous mob. Second, subnational politics: the federal level of institutional decision-making is not enough to understand how the crisis unraveled and was processed, as the ultimate decisions were made at governors' summits instead of through regular congressional proceedings.
This paper was set to answer three questions. First, it reviewed the way in which the stage for the events of December 2001 was set, with a view to assessing the degree to which the main opposition party was involved. It was shown how the by-elections of October 2001 conferred the PJ a congressional majority. While it cannot be said that the PJ aimed at toppling the president, it has been shown that its leaders were aware of the fragility of the ruling coalition. Hence, they made institutional decisions that were at odds with Argentina's political traditions. Their goal was not to support the president but to secure his office should a vacancy occur.
The second question posed whether the rebellion was spontaneous or orchestrated. The answer is mixed -though tilted towards the latter. The "argentinazo", as the street protests of December 2001 came to be called, was not a homogeneous phenomenon. It comprised "the wave of food riots that occurred alongside thousands of people blockading roads and bridges throughout the country, and the banging pots and pans in the main plaza of Buenos Aires" (Auyero 2006: 10) . In and around Buenos
Aires, it was a concurrent manifestation of at least three different social sectors: middleclass citizens of the Federal district, the urban poor of the metropolitan surroundings, and a number of criminal gangs made up of suburban lumpen-proletariat. The motivations and behavior of these groups were different. Middle-class protesters (caceroleros) objected to the bank freezing and were particularly irritated by the numb speech that President De la Rúa broadcasted in the afternoon on December 19. The urban poor (saqueadores) had more prosaic needs and concrete objectives: to take home as much goodies, especially but not exclusively food, as they could. The goals of the gangs do not require a long explanation; they mingled among the looters and benefited from the confusion. What the two latter groups have in common is that they were linked to or organized by local political bosses of Buenos Aires province. The spontaneity of the protests was limited to the first group, i.e. the caceroleros. Activists from extremeleft parties also played a role, more relevant in igniting the violence in the Federal district than in fueling the suburban disturbs. There was, all in all, a "grey zone where the deeds and networks of looters, political entrepreneurs and law enforcement officials meet and mesh" (Auyero 2006: 1; also Auyero and Moran 2005) . In sum, while there was a segment of the popular protest that was spontaneous, the more violent and consequential demonstrations were either fomented or taken advantage of by political groups.
Finally, the issue was raised as to whom were the main actors behind the scene in the resolution of the crisis. This paper has argued that, although formal institutions such as Congress played a part, the bulk of decisions were made within a more informal forum that do not belong to the federal level of authority: the summit meetings of the provincial governors.
The literature that deals with the December 2001 events is mostly split as regards its focus: it concentrates either on the causes or the resolution of the crisis. The former highlights the social mobilization in the streets that led to successive presidential resignations (Auyero 2006; Schuster et al 2002) ; the latter underlines the institutional procedures that allowed Congress to find a constitutional solution that were politically viable (Mustapic 2005) . A few others perform broader comparative analyses of several Latin American cases, which help to locate the events described above in regional and historical context (Hochstetler 2006; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2003a , 2003b , 2005 . I contend that most of these approaches, however insightful, tend to overlook a crucial set of actors that were neither marching in the streets nor voting in Congress. In Argentina these actors had two features: they were subnational powerholders (either governors or mayors) and they were Peronist. Their protagonism is crucial to understand how the social protest was ignited in the first place and how the crisis unfolded and was maneuvered thereafter. Furthermore, the role they played highlights key historical continuities that underlie contemporary Argentine politics, no matter how unique the events analyzed here may appear.
